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1. Introduction  
The purpose of this chapter is to propose a meta methodology to promote engineering safety 
by learning from previous system failures. The predominant worldview in IT engineering is 
that systems failures can be prevented at the design phase. This worldview is obvious if we 
examine mainstream, current methodologies for managing system failures. These 
methodologies use a reductionist approach and are based on a static model (Nakamura & 
Kijima, 2007, 2008a). It is often pointed out that most such methodologies have difficulty 
coping with emergent properties in a proactive manner and preventing the introduction of 
various side effects from quick (i.e., temporary) fixes, which leads to repeating failures of 
similar type. There are many examples of similar system failures repeating and of negative 
side effects created by quick fixes. Introducing safety redundant mechanisms does little to 
reduce human errors. As pointed out by Perrow (1999, p. 260), the more redundancy is used to 
promote safety, the greater the chance of spurious actuation; “redundancy is not always the 
correct design option to use.” While instrumentation is being improved to enable operators to 
run their operations more efficiently and certainly with greater ease, the risk would seem to 
remain about the same. The main reason for this situation is that current methodologies tend 
to identify a system failure as a single, static event, so organizational learning tends to be 
limited to a single loop rather than a double loop in rectifying the model of the model (i.e., the 
meta model) of action (i.e., the operating norm). This indicates that we need a meta 
methodology that can manage the dynamic aspects of system failure, by ensuring the efficacy 
of its countermeasures through the promotion of double loop learning. 
In this chapter, we propose a meta methodology called System of System Failures (SOSF), 
along with a system diagnostic failure flow, in order to overcome the current 
methodologies’ shortcomings. We also demonstrate this meta methodology’s efficacy 
through an application in IT engineering. 
In the next section, we explain the current troubleshooting techniques’ features and 
limitations with respect to certain aspects of system failures. Section 3 describes the three 
key features required in order to overcome these limitations, as well as SOSF, which actually 
overcomes the limitations. In section 4, we propose the actual application scenario that fully 
utilizes SOSF to promote double loop learning, or total system intervention for system 
failure (TSI for SF). The SOSF and related methodologies are used in the course of the 
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subsequent discussion and debate to agree upon who is responsible for the failure and to 
identify the preventative measures to be applied. In section 5, an application example in 
information and communication technologies engineering demonstrates that using the 
proposed “TSI for SF” helps prevent future system failures by learning from previous 
system failures, followed by a concluding discussion of a efficacy of the SOSF and three 
actions were identified for preventing further system failures: close the gap between the 
stakeholders, introduce absolute goals and enlarge system boundary. 
2. Limitations of current troubleshooting techniques 
The predominant technology of current ICT troubleshooting is based on a predefined goal-
seeking model. van Gigch (1991) points out the main shortcomings of system improvement in 
this model, as follows. (1) Engineers look for causes of malfunctions within the system 
boundary. The rationale of system improvement tends to justify systems as ends in 
themselves, without considering that a system exists only to satisfy the requirements of larger 
systems in which it is included. (2) Engineers seek to restore systems back to normal. A lasting 
solution cannot result from an improvement in the operation of a present system. An 
improvement in operations is not a lasting improvement. (3) Engineers tend to hold incorrect, 
obsolete assumptions and goals. It is not difficult to find organizations in which the 
formulation of assumptions and goals has not been explicit. Fostering system improvement in 
this context is senseless. (4) Engineers act as “planner followers” rather than as “planner 
leaders.” Another manifestation of the problem of holding incorrect assumptions and 
pursuing the wrong goals can be traced to different concepts of planning and of the planner’s 
role. In the context of system design, the planner must be a planner leader, planning to 
influence trends, instead of a planner follower, planning to satisfy trends. 
This chapter focuses on system failure aspects that current methodologies cannot manage 
properly in the sense pointed out by van Gigch. To summarize, these aspects are soft, 
systemic, emergent, and dynamic; i.e., they accommodate multiple stakeholders’ 
worldviews (Checkland, 1981; Checkland & Holwell, 1997). 
Technology is changing faster than engineering technology can treat system failures. The 
growing increase in CPU power versus price is well known in the form of Moore’s law. 
Moreover, the numbers of stakeholders in computer systems is getting bigger and bigger. 
For computer architects, the stakeholders should encompass clients of clients (i.e., end users) 
in order to satisfy ICT system owner’s requirements. ICT system provider should focus on 
the dynamic aspects of end users and ICT system owners (e.g., through capacity planning of 
web banking system design), as well as on computer components (HDDs, CPUs, etc.) 
supplied by various vendors in order to implement synthesized functions. The 
environmental changes surrounding ICT systems, in terms of speed and complexity, are 
increasing over time. The problem is that once a system failure happens under these 
circumstances, it is extremely difficult to identify the real root cause. Most troubleshooting 
methodologies view system failures as resulting from a sequence of events. Furthermore, 
they focus mainly on the technical aspects of system failures. These models are only suitable 
for a relatively simple system with unitary participants from a technical perspective. 
The following four key features are commonly pointed out for the current troubleshooting 
methodologies surrounding ICT system environments. Explanations of system failures in 
terms of a reductionist approach (i.e., an event chain of actions and errors) are not very useful 
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for designing improved systems (Rasmussen, 1997; Leveson, 2004). In addition, Perrow (1999) 
argues that the conventional engineering approach to ensure safety – building in more 
warnings and safeguards – fails because system complexity makes failures inevitable. 
1. Current methodologies are technically well established (e.g., ISO and IEC standards) 
but are not always helpful for understanding the real implications of countermeasures 
and whether they are real solutions or merely tentative fixes from outside the technical 
arena. Moreover, most methodologies are based on a reductionist worldview. 
2. The current troubleshooting mainstream applies cause-effect analysis (or event chain 
analysis) to find out real root causes. Forward sequences (as in FMEA or event trees) or 
backward sequences (as in fault trees) are often employed (IEC 60812 (2006), IEC 61025 
(2006)). Toyota has a corporate slogan suggesting to “ask why five times” to reach root 
causes. This promotes finding “what” in order to seek counter measures to the problem. 
This approach, however, tends to become a victim-finding tool for blaming a specific 
person or group rather than finding a real root cause. 
3. The enormous speed of technological advance causes various misunderstandings 
between ICT system stakeholders. This responsibility disjunction cannot be managed 
properly with current methodologies. 
4. Improvement of the deviation from operating norm is bound to fail, as van Gigch (1991) 
points out that the treatment of system problems by improving the operation of existing 
systems is bound to fail. Current troubleshooting methodologies focus on the following 
main problems: 
• The system does not meet its established goals. 
• The system does not yield predicted results. 
• The system does not operate as initially intended. 
The basic assumption of improvement is that the goal and operating norm are static and 
predetermined at the design phase and are based on hard systems thinking. 
The above four features hinder examination of system failures from a holistic viewpoint, 
making it impossible to manage the soft, systemic, emergent, and dynamic aspects of system 
failures. 
3. Double loop learning and System of System Failures (SOSF) 
3.1 Double loop learning and three key success factors for new methodology  
To overcome the current methodological shortcomings discussed above, we need to 
promote double loop learning. The most important key success factor is the ability to ask a 
question with respect to a current operating norm (i.e., a mental model). Skill in double loop 
learning should enable people to question basic assumptions, which leads to modification of 
their mental models (Fig. 1) to create action producing desired goals, rather than simply 
modification of their actions under current mental models (Argyris & Schoen, 1996; Morgan, 
1986; Senge, 1990).  
Double loop learning should influence all three layers listed in Table 1: reality is for 
changing actions, model is for changing desired goals, and meta is for modifying mental 
models. Figure 1 explains single and double loop learning in a multi-stakeholder 
environment based on a double loop learning model (Morgan, 1986). The dotted line in Fig. 
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1 indicates one specific stakeholder for achieving a goal. The one stakeholder alone is not 
enough to overcome current methodological shortcomings. We should thus expand double 
loop learning to account for a multi-stakeholder situation. Under this situation, there are 
three key success factors for overcoming current methodological shortcomings. First, there 
should be common language among the stakeholders’ mental models (i.e., the mental model 
box in each stakeholder’s domain in Fig. 1). Otherwise, the failures caused by stakeholders’ 
mental model gaps will not be resolved effectively. Second, there should be a meta 
methodology (i.e., the meta model box in Fig. 1) to promote double loop learning. This meta 
methodology should be unique between stakeholders; otherwise, the mutually exclusive 
and collectively exhaustive (MECE) nature of countermeasures is hard to achieve. Therefore, 
there is only one meta model box in Fig. 1, and it is shared among stakeholders. Third, there 
should be failure classes based on the origin of a failure. This is essential to ensure the 
efficacy of countermeasures. There are three origins of system failures: i) the mental model, 
ii) a mental model gap between stakeholders, and iii) the meta model. These three origins 
correspond to failure classes 1 (failure of deviance), 2 (failure of interface), and 3 (failure of 
foresight), respectively, as indicated in Fig. 1. The following explains the three key success 
factors in detail. 
1. We should have a common language for understanding system failures. It is vital to 
examine system failures from various perspectives. System safety can be achieved 
through the actions of various stakeholders. One such common language was 
developed by van Gigch (1986) for taxonomy of system failures. There are six categories 
of system failures, namely, failures of i) technology, ii) behavior, iii) structure, iv) 
regulation, v) rationality, and vi) evolution.  
2. We should have a meta methodology to ensure that countermeasures are correct and 
essential rather than just quick fixes that introduce long-term side effects. To redress 
system malfunctions or a system failure, it is necessary first to translate specific failure 
events into a model world in order to appraise the nature of reality holistically, then to 
discuss the system failure’s model in the modeling phase (i.e., metamodeling) in order to 
investigate why the failure happened, what the countermeasures are, and what should be 
learned in the organizational process so as to avoid further occurrence of the failure. 
Kickert (1980) explained an organizational structure model corresponding to the 
organizational purpose and breaking the organizational structure down into three layers: 
the aspect system, subsystem, and phase system. These layers relate to “what,” “who,” 
and “when,” respectively. Beer’s VSM model (Beer, 1979; 1980) rectifies the organizational 
process. Systems 1 to 3 are the operational level, and systems 4 and 5 are the meta level for 
deciding the operating norm through communication outside the system environment. 
There are hierarchical similarities between Kickert’s and Beer’s models, as follows: 
• Systems 1 to 3 correspond to the phase system managing “when.” These levels 
ensure internal harmony and maintain internal homeostasis. Systems 1, 2, and 3 
represent when an operation should be done, how it is coordinated, and how to 
maintain corporate management, respectively. 
• System 4 for strategic corporate management corresponds to the subsystem 
managing “who.” This level integrates internal and external inputs in order to 
chart enterprise strategies (i.e., external homeostasis) and clarifies who should be 
responsible for those strategies. 
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• System 5 for normative corporate management corresponds to the aspect system 
managing “what.” This level formulates long-term policies (i.e., planning and 
foresight) and decides what should be done. 
Kickert’s organizational model and Beer’s VSM model both decompose organization into 
three layers: reality (i.e., operation), model (i.e., adaptation), and meta (i.e., evolution). The 
reality and model layers seek to answer “how,” and the meta layer seeks to answer “what.” 
This differentiation is crucial to ensure the efficacy of countermeasures. Table 1 summarizes 
the relations between the organizational structure (Kickert, 1980) and VSM (Beer, 1979; 1980) 
models. 
 
Fig. 1. Single and double loop learning under a multi-stakeholder environment. 
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 Organization structure Objective VSM 
Meta Aspect system: What Mental model System 5 
Model Subsystem: Who Operating norm System 4 
Reality Phase system: When Operation Systems 1-3 
Table 1. Relations between the organization structure (Kickert) and VSM (Beer) models. 
3. We should be able to specify three failure classes in order to avoid the dynamic aspects 
of system failures (i.e., erosion of safety goals over time). These failure classes should 
intentionally be identified in conjunction with the VSM model. They should clarify the 
system boundary and the nature of a problem (i.e., predictable or unpredictable). The 
failure classes are logically identified according to the following criteria: 
• Class 1 (failure of deviance): The root causes are within the system boundary, and 
conventional troubleshooting techniques are applicable and effective. 
• Class 2 (failure of interface): The root causes are outside the system boundary but 
predictable at the design phase. 
• Class 3 (failure of foresight): The root causes are outside the system boundary and 
unpredictable at the design phase. 
The failure classes thus depend on whether the root causes are inside or outside the system 
boundary, and a class 3 failure for one person can be a class 1 or 2 failure for other people. 
Therefore, the definition is relative and recursive, so it is important to identify the problem 
owner in terms of two aspects: the stakeholder group, and the VSM system (i.e., systems 1 to 
5). Unless those two aspects are clarified, failure classes cannot be identified. 
It is necessary to recognize the organizational system level in order to rectify the operational 
norm, because to prevent further occurrence of system failures, it is inadequate to change 
only systems 1 to 3 (or the phase system for seeking when and how). As pointed out above, 
current technological models mainly focus on the operational area, and this can lead to side 
effects resulting from quick fixes. Event chain models developed to explain system failures 
usually concentrate on the proximate events immediately preceding the failures. The 
foundation of a system failure, however, is often laid years before the failure occurs. In this 
situation, the VSM model and Kickert’s model serve well for understanding the real root 
causes. 
In a stable environment, control of activities and maintenance of their safety through a 
prescriptive manual approach deriving rules of conduct from the top down can be effective. 
In the present dynamic environment, however, this static approach is inadequate, and a 
fundamentally different view of system modeling is required. Section 3.4 thus describes a 
dynamic model explaining why fixing failures sometimes introduces unintended side effects 
and how dynamic understanding contributes to introducing countermeasures that are 
ultimately more effective. 
3.2 System of System Failures (SOSF) 
From the above considerations, we now propose a new methodology, called System of 
System Failures (SOSF), to promote double loop learning and satisfy the above three key 
success factors. Double loop learning is essential for determining whether operating norms 
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(i.e., mental models) are appropriate (Argyris & Schoen, 1996; Morgan, 1986; Senge, 1990). It 
also provides a meta methodology for changing mental models so as to overcome system 
improvement shortcomings (Leveson, 2004; Perrow, 1999; Rasmussen, 1997; van Gigch, 
1991), as explained in section 2. Among the meta methodologies proposed in a general 
context, the System of System Methodologies (SOSM) developed by Jackson (Jackson, 2003) 
is a typical, excellent example. SOSM’s main features are the following: i) a meta systemic 
approach ; i.e. soft system thinking to foster double loop learning (Checkland, 1981; 
Checkland & Holwell, 1997), and ii) complementarism by encompassing multiple 
paradigms (contingent approach by combination of various methodologies from various 
paradigms, depending on problem situations). Figure 2 shows the framework of SOSM. 
Various classes of systems thinking are located in two-dimensional space, where the two 
dimensions are participants and systems. The current troubleshooting techniques discussed 
in section 2 (i.e., FTA, FMEA, IEC) belong to the unitary-simple domain in SOSM.  
 
Fig. 2. Systems approaches related to problem context in the System of System 
Methodologies (SOSM). 
In particular, SOSF is designed by allocating each type of failure from a taxonomy of system 
failures (van Gigch, 1986) into SOSM space (Fig. 3). There is no coercive domain in SOSF, 
because the main focus of this chapter is technological systems rather than social systems. 
The stakeholders for achieving engineering safety are covered fully by the unitary and 
pluralist domains in SOSM. The allocation of each type of failure from SOSM into SOSF is 
quite straightforward. The structure connecting SOSM and SOSF is shown in Fig. 4. The left-
hand side represents layers of abstraction from reality to methodology to meta 
methodology. In the realm of system failures, a system failure on the bottom line 
corresponds to the reality layer. The common language (i.e., the taxonomy of failure) 
corresponds to the methodology layer. A meta failure (i.e., SOSF) corresponds to the meta 
methodology layer. Therefore, SOSF is an example of SOSM in the realm of system failure. It 
is worthwhile to mention the recursive feature of SOSF, depending on the viewpoint of the 
system. If a target system is broken down into subsystems, each subsystem has its own 
instance of SOSF. Therefore, a technology failure might be a failure of evolution, one level 
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down, from the viewpoint of the subsystem. Furthermore, this failure of evolution might be 
a failure of regulation, one level higher, from the viewpoint of the system of systems.  
To satisfy the third feature (differentiating the three failure classes) pointed out in section 
3.1, we should introduce a third dimension, namely, the failure class. Figure 5 expands two-
dimensional SOSF (Fig. 3) into three-dimensional SOSF space, with the addition of the 
system failure dimension. 
 
Fig. 3. System of System Failures (SOSF). 
 
Fig. 4. Meta modeling of system failures and SOSF by using SOSM. 
As explained above, because of this recursive nature, it is vital to identify the problem 
owner in terms of who (i.e., the stakeholder) and where (i.e., the system level in terms of 
vertical dimension in Table 1). 
Table 2 summarizes the general notation of system failures for confirming the mutually 
exclusive and collectively exhaustive (MECE) nature of the diagnosis, as well as “who,” 
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“where,” and “what,” which stand for the stakeholder, systems 1 to 5, and the failure class, 
respectively. The horizontal arrows in Table 2 show that at the same system level, 
stakeholders should be compared in order to identify responsibilities. If a stakeholder is 
identified, the system level (1 to 5) and objective (what, who, and when) should be identified 
using the vertical arrows. This ensures the efficacy of double loop learning by changing the 
model of the model (i.e., the meta model of the operating norm). 
 
Fig. 5. Three-dimensional SOSF space. 
 
Table 2. General notation of system failure. 
In the next section, we introduce the two new methodologies that cover the SOSF space.   
3.3 Failure factor structuring methodology 
We propose new failure factor structuring methodology to overcome system failures caused 
by complex failure factors (Nakamura & Kijima, 2008a). Generally, complex system failures 
arise from a variety of factors and combinations of those factors. Since these factors often 
have a qualitative nature, it is important to have a holistic view that reveals the quantitative 
relationships among qualitative factors in order to construct an effective methodology. The 
methodology should address complex system failures in terms of obtaining the observations 
needed to rectify the worldview of maintenance (i.e., double-loop learning). The failure 
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factor structuring methodology (FFSM) should promote double-loop learning through 
viewing the system in a holistic way. Figure 6 shows a general overview of this 
methodology, and Table 3 lists the objectives for each phase of FFSM.  
 
Fig. 6. General overview of FFSM 
 
Table 3. Objectives for phases 1, 2, and 3 of FFSM 
3.4 System failure dynamic model  
We propose new nonlinear systemic model to overcome system failures caused by 
environmental changes through time (Nakamura & Kijima, 2008b, 2009a). This “system 
failure dynamic model (SFDM)” is based on system failure class. The frequent occurrence of 
deviant system failures has become regular but poorly understood. For example, deviant 
system failure is believed to lead to NASA’s Challenger and Columbia space shuttle disasters 
(Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, Chapter 6, pp. 130). This normalized 
deviance effect is hard to understand from a static failure analysis model. NASA points out 
the notion of “History as Cause” for repeated disastrous failures (Columbia Accident 
Investigation Board Report, Chapter 8). These considerations imply usefulness to focus on 
the dynamic aspects of the cause and effect of system failures rather than the static aspects. 
Dynamic model analysis is applicable in all technology arenas, including high-risk 
technology domains like that of NASA. Turner and Pidgeon (1997) found that organizations 
responsible for a failure had “failure of foresight” in common. The failure or the disaster had 
a long incubation period characterized by a number of discrepant events signaling potential 
danger. These events were typically overlooked or misinterpreted and accumulated 
unnoticed. To clarify that mechanism, Turner and Pidgeon decomposed the system lifecycle 
www.intechopen.com
 System of System Failure: Meta Methodology to Prevent System Failures 
 
41 
from the initial development stage to cultural readjustment through catastrophic disasters 
into six stages (Turner & Pidgeon, 1977, p. 88). They are Stage I: Initial beliefs and norms, 
Stage II: Incubation period, Stage III: Precipitating event, Stage IV: Onset, Stage V: Rescue 
and salvage and Stage VI: Full cultural readjustment. The second stage, or incubation 
period, is hard to identify due to the various side effects of quick fixes (Turner & Pidgeon, 
1997). Therefore the second stage is playing the crucial role to lead catastrophic disaster. 
System failures have specific features corresponding to these six stages. Class 1 failures 
occur in the early stages, while Class 2 and 3 failures emerge gradually over time. If we have 
a way to identify the class of a failure, we can prolong the system life cycle by introducing 
countermeasures. SFDM should be used periodically to ensure that the system behaves as 
expected (Reason, 1997, 2003) and that side effects due to quick fixes are prevented. 
3.5 Relationships among SOSF and related methodologies 
The SOSF meta-methodology overcomes the shortcomings of the current methodologies. 
The current methodologies (i.e., FTA and FMEA) are reviewed through SOSF and the two 
new methodologies (i.e., FFSM and SFDM) are proposed to complement the shortcoming of 
the current methodologies. The relationships among SOSF, FFSM, SFDM, and system 
failures are illustrated in Figure 7. 
 
Fig. 7. Relationships among SOSF, FFSM, and SFDM 
Table 4 shows the methodology mapping onto SOSF space. 
 
 Within same class Spread over different classes 
Unitary vs. unitary FTA, FEMA FFSM 
Spread over different domains SFDM 
Table 4. Methodology mapping to SOSF space 
4. Total system intervention for system failure (TSI for SF) methodology as 
an application procedure 
Total system intervention (TSI) is a critical system practice for managing complex and 
differing viewpoints. In the previous chapter, we introduces meta-methodology called 
“system of system failures (SOSF)” as a common language among various stakeholders to 
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improve their understanding of system failures. Then we propose the actual application 
scenario, or “TSI for SF”. The SOSF and related methodologies are used in the course of the 
subsequent discussion and debate to agree upon who is responsible for the failure and to 
identify the preventative measures to be applied. Flood and Jackson (1991) identified seven 
principles underpinning the TSI. 
First principle: Problem situations are too complicated to understand from one perspective, 
and the issues they throw up are too complex to tackle with quick fixes. 
Second principle: Problem situations, and the concerns, issues, and problems they embody, 
should therefore be investigated from a variety of perspectives. 
Third principle: Once the major issues and problems have been highlighted, a suitable 
systems methodology or methodologies must be identified to guide intervention. 
Fourth principle: The relative strengths and weaknesses of different system methodologies 
should be appreciated, and this knowledge, together with an understanding of the main 
issues and concerns, should guide the choice of appropriate methodologies. 
Fifth principle: Different perspectives and system methodologies should be used in a 
complementary way to highlight and address different aspects of organizations and their 
issues and problems. 
Sixth principle: The TSI sets out a systemic cycle of inquiry with interaction back and forth 
between its three phases. 
Seventh principle: Facilitators and participants are engaged at all stages of the TSI process. 
Jackson (2006) argues the sixth principle refers to the three phases of the TSI meta-
methodology: creativity, choice, and implementation. These three phases precede a reflection 
phase. Therefore, the critical systems practice it embraces is an enhanced version of ‘total 
systems intervention’ (Flood & Jackson, 1991), which has four phases: creativity, choice, 
implementation, and reflection (Jackson, 2006). 
Based upon the seven principles identified by Flood and Jackson (1991), we introduced new 
TSI for SF as an application procedure and it has six phases as follows. 
4.1 Phase 1. Become aware of system failure relating to the first principle 
Owners of issues and problems understand that they are too complicated to understand from 
one perspective, and the issues they throw up are too complex to tackle with quick fixes.  
4.2 Phase 2. Identify stakeholders relating to the second principle 
Owners of issues and problems should identify stakeholders relating to the issues or 
problems from phase 1.  
4.3 Phase 3. Creativity: Identify metaphors relating to the third and the creativity 
phase in the sixth principle 
In the creativity phase, the many different possible views of organizations and their 
problems should be recognized, and managers and analysts should be encouraged to 
explore them through the use of Morgan’s (1986) “images or metaphors,” particularly the 
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machine, organism, brain, culture, and coercive system metaphors. The aim is to take the 
broadest possible critical look at the problem situation but gradually to focus on those 
aspects currently most crucial to the organization (Jackson, 2006). 
In order to understand system failures, we need models and metaphors. Then 
methodologies are developed depending upon those metaphors. We introduce three system 
failure models with metaphors (i.e., the third principle). 
4.3.1 Simple linear system failure model (Domino metaphor) 
The archetype of a simple linear model explains system failure as the linear propagation of a 
chain of causes and effects (Heinrich et al., 1980). Figure 8 shows the domino metaphor for 
this model. The underlying principle is that system failure development is deterministic and 
there must have cause effect links. FTA (IEC 61025 (2006)) and FMEA (IEC 60812 (2006)) are 
the representative methodologies. They follow backward and forward chain respectively.   
 
Fig. 8. Domino metaphor 
4.3.2 Complex linear system failure model (Swiss cheese metaphor) 
The archetype of a complex linear model is well known Swiss cheese model (Fig. 9) first 
proposed by Reason (1997, 2003). The model put the importance on latent as well as 
manifested causes. The authors proposed FFSM (Nakamura & Kijima, 2008a, 2009b) as 
surfacing hidden (latent) factors to suppress deviations leading to system failures.  
 
Fig. 9. Swiss cheese metaphor 
4.3.3 Non linear or systemic model (Unrocking boat metaphor) 
Perrow (1999) argues that the conventional engineering approach to ensure safety – building 
in more warnings and safeguards – fails because system complexity makes failures 
inevitable. This indicates that we need a new model that can manage the system failure. 
Reason (1997, 2003) explains the organizational life span between protection and 
catastrophe. The lifespan of a hypothetical organization through production-protection 
space (Fig. 10) explains why organizational accidents repeat, with this history ending in 
catastrophe. This is why the periodic application of the methodology prolong system life 
cycle.  
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Fig. 10. Lifespan of a hypothetical organization through production-protection space 
4.4 Phase 4. Choice: Select methodology using SOSF meta-methodology relating to 
the fourth and the choice phase in the sixth principle 
In this phase, the metaphors generated in the creativity phase are mapped to the SOSF space 
(Nakamura & Kijima, 2009a) to match the methodology to the problem situation. In the 
SOSF meta-methodology, problem situations are mapped using three axes 
(simple/complex, unitary/plural, and Class 1/2/3) in accordance with the degree of 
(dis)agreement between participants. Problem situations are then mapped to the 
methodologies as outlined in Table 5. Note that the SOSF meta-methodology is used not to 
deterministically prescribe which methodology to choose but to illuminate and inform that 
choice (i.e., the fourth principle).  
 
Table 5. Three system-failure models and their approach to management 
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We introduce a matrix that clarifies the differences in opinion among stakeholders. Using it 
helps to clarify the stakeholder views and to identify stakeholders with opposing views. In 
the example stakeholder matrix in Fig. 11, stakeholders “a” and “b” have opposing views, as 
shown on the left. After they discuss and debate their views, stakeholder “a” takes 
responsibility, as shown on the right. In short, a diagonal matrix is created from a non-
diagonal one. Table 5 summarizes the system failure models and related methodologies as 
well as the meta-methodology.  
 
Fig. 11. Stakeholder matrix 
4.5 Phase 5. Implementation: Take action relating to fifth and the implementation 
phase in the sixth principle 
In the implementation phase, methodologies are applied to produce change. The 
methodologies should be used in a complementary way to highlight and address different 
aspects of organizations and their issues and problems (i.e., the fifth principle). In this phase, 
the selected methodology in table 5 could be used in accordance with the complementary 
principles of TSI. 
4.6 Phase 6. Reflection: Acquire new learning relating to the reflection phase in the 
sixth principle 
In the reflection phase, the intervention should be evaluated and learning about the problem 
situation, the meta-methodology itself, the generic system methodologies, and the specific 
methods used should be produced. The outcome is research findings that are used, for 
example, as feedback for improving earlier stages of the meta-methodology (i.e., Fig. 12). 
The relationship between the stages is shown in Fig. 12. There are two feedback loops in Fig. 
12. One is to the metaphors (phase3) and the other is to the methodologies (phase4). 
5. Application to ICT systems 
This section discusses an example application of the TSI for SF methodology to an ICT 
system failure caused by an operator error resulting from a misunderstanding of the 
product specifications. In this case, the operator or users who use the products in question 
was responsible for the failure. The incident escalation procedure is shown in Fig. 13. Those 
users who encounter the problems of the products report the incident to the help desk, and 
the help desk provides them with a solution. The help desk then identifies the cause of the 
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incident, and, if it was caused by faulty product design, the help desk escalates it to the 
development section for further investigation. The development section designs new 
products on the basis of data for the escalated incidents that the help desk believes were due 
to product defects. This is mainly because the user-related incidents are screened at the help 
desk so that the development section can concentrate on product-related issues. The 
development section measures product quality by AFR (Annual Failure Rate) using only the 
incidents escalated from the help desk, not by ACR (Annual Call Rate) using all the 
incidents received directly from the users. AFR is introduced to measure a product quality 
not to measure a system quality. Therefore AFR is a part of ACR. The metric for product 
quality is the AFR and system quality that includes product quality is the ACR, which are 
calculated as shown in Fig. 14.   
 
Fig. 12. The application flow for TSI for SF 
 
Fig. 13. Incident escalation procedure 
 
Fig. 14. Calculation of annual failure rate (AFR) and annual call rate (ACR) 
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As mentioned above, there are six phases in the application procedure for TSI for SF. The 
followings are the summary of the actual application example.  
5.1 Phase 1. Become aware of system failure 
In the first stage of intervention, the development section believes that the quality of their 
product is superior to the average quality of its competitors’ products on the basis of 
internal benchmarking. A third party customer survey reveals that customers judge the 
quality to be less than that revealed by the internal benchmarking. Upon learning of this 
discrepancy, the system quality assurance (SQA) section of the ICT system provider sets up 
a working group to identify the problems.      
5.2 Phase 2. Identify stakeholders  
The owner of the working group, the SQA section, identifies three stakeholders: an SE 
(representing a user or operator), the help desk representing the first line engineer, and the 
development section representing the second line engineer.  
5.3 Phase 3. Creativity: Identify metaphors 
The SQA section identifies the difference in the key performance indicators (KPIs) between 
the help desk and the development section. The help desk’s KPIs are mainly related to the 
processing speed and the development section is to the AFR. The SQA section recognizes 
that increasing the speed should not increase the number of incidents escalated to 
development section. Furthermore, one way to improve the AFR is to close incidents as user 
responsible incidents (Fig. 13). Obviously, this may not the best way to handle incidents. 
Therefore, the two sections’ KPIs are not user oriented. The SQA section identifies the 
unrocking boat metaphor (Table 5) as appropriate for this situation (i.e., the organization is 
drifting through the environment between excessive economic gain and safety).     
5.4 Phase 4. Choice: Select methodology using SOSF meta-methodology 
The stakeholder opinions are clarified using the stakeholder matrix (Fig. 11) in order to 
identify stakeholders with opposing views. As shown in Table 6, the SE and development 
section have opposing views. The Help desk claims that the SE made an error in operation.  
 
Table 6. Stakeholder matrix 
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The SQA section uses the SFDM to identify three archetypes:  
- misunderstanding a Class 2 or 3 failure as a Class 1 failure, (problem) 
- erosion of safety goals accompanied by incentive to report fewer incidents (side effect), 
and 
- fix that fails (side effect). 
5.4.1 Misunderstanding Class 2 or 3 failure as Class 1 failure (problem) 
The source of the failure is inside the help desk system boundary (i.e., a Class 1 failure) 
although the actual cause is outside the boundary. This archetype (Fig. 15) explains why 
system failures reoccur following a quick fix or an inappropriate fix. Such fixes might reduce 
the number of system failures in the short term, but the effects of such fixes gradually 
become saturated at a level below the organization’s goal (i.e., target) level. The balancing 
intended consequence (BIC) loop becomes open, so quick fixes have no further effect. The 
balancing unintended consequence (BUC) loop also becomes open as a result of 
misunderstanding the system failure class and not introducing an effective solution. The 
sequence of this archetype is from (1) to (5) in Fig. 15. Arrow (1) with the “+” sign indicates 
that an increase in the number of Class 1 failures causes an increase in the number of 
actions. Arrow (2) with the “+” sign indicates that the increase in the number of actions 
increases the number of quick fixes. Arrow (3) indicates that the increase in the number of 
quick fixes contributes slightly to reducing the number of Class 1 failures. The root cause is 
outside the system boundary and is unaffected by arrow (4). Therefore, arrow (5) with the 
“+” sign indicates that the root cause increases the number of Class 1 failures.   
 
Fig. 15. Misunderstanding system failure archetype 
The archetype shown in Fig. 15 is a single-loop learning scenario—a reinforcing action is 
introduced that is based on the deviation from a predetermined goal. The reinforcing 
intended consequences (RICs) action to improve the situation leads to the introduction of 
additional quick fixes, which simply leads to the repetition of a similar scenario. The 
sequence of this archetype is from (6) to (7) in Fig. 15. Arrow (6) with the “+” sign indicates 
that an increase in the number of Class 1 failures reinforces the compare goal and reinforce 
action. Arrow (7) with the “+” sign indicates that reinforcing the compare goal and adjust 
action increases the number of actions. The RICs action causes various side effects, including 
erosion of safety goals accompanied by an incentive to report fewer incidents. These side 
effects are hard to detect because the performance malfunction alarm is muted, and 
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management can identify these effects only by quantitatively measuring performance. This 
explains why a single-loop learning solution for improving system performance is bound to 
fail, as Van Gigch (1991) pointed out. In this situation, the root cause outside the system 
boundary must also be addressed.  
5.4.2 Erosion of safety goals accompanied by incentive to report fewer incidents 
This side effect is introduced when the RICs loop becomes tighter without a further 
reduction in the number of system failures (Fig. 15). Increased pressure to achieve the goal 
emerges from the BUC loop in the form of shifting the goal (i.e., lowering it) and/or hiding 
the actual state of quality or safety from management. In this relative achievement scenario, 
a manager who stays within the system boundary has difficulty detecting the actual state of 
achievement. This is why many Japanese manufacturers have the slogan “3R-ism,” which 
reminds managers to identify a problem at a “real site,” confirm it with “real objects,” and 
discuss it with a “real person in charge” before taking any action. The sequence of this 
archetype is from (8) to (9) in Fig. 15. Arrow (8) with the “+” sign indicates that an increase 
in the number of Class 1 failures causes pressure to adjust the goal or creates an incentive to 
report fewer incidents. Arrow (9) with the “−” sign indicates an increase in the number of 
Class 1 failures that are hidden. 
5.4.3 Fix that fails archetype (side effect) 
The source of the failure is outside the help desk’s system boundary. Figure 16 illustrates a 
typical example of local optimization. The action taken for the root cause is a short-term 
solution to the problem that introduces delayed, unintended consequences outside the 
system boundary, resulting in a Class 2 or 3 failure. For example, an operations manager 
might shift resources from a proactive task team to a reactive task team because of a rapid 
increase in system failures, which would only cause the reinforcing unintended 
consequence (RUC) loop to further increase the number of system failures. This out-of-
control situation can only be managed at the expense of others and damages the 
organization in the long term. The sequence of this archetype is from (1) to (6) in Fig. 16. 
Arrow (1) with the “+” sign indicates that an increase in the number of Class 2 or 3 failures 
increases the number of actions within the system boundary. These actions do not attack the 
root cause (i.e., dotted arrow (5)). Therefore, arrow (2) with the “+” sign has no effect on 
reducing the number of Class 2 or 3 failures. Alternatively, the arrow with the time-delay 
symbol (=) might increase the number of Class 2 or 3 failures because of local optimization 
side effects. Arrows (3) and (4) with the “+” sign introduce an adjust goal and reinforce 
action without further reducing the number of Class 2 or 3 failures. Arrows (5) and (6) are 
not in effect during this phase of the archetype.  
In this application example, as a result the stakeholders reached the broader and holistic 
understanding using the SOSF meta-methodology. At initial stage (i.e., preceding stage 5), 
the user thought these errors are not operation-related but product-related. Conversely, the 
development section thought they are operation-related. Therefore, the user insisted that 
they are Class 3 failures of evolution in complex and plural domains in SOSF. Conversely, 
the development section insisted that they are Class 1 failures of behavior in a simple and 
unitary domain. Figure 17 illustrates the SOSF space showing all stakeholder opinions. 
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Fig. 16. Fix that fails archetype (side effect) 
 
Fig. 17. Simple-Unitary (Class 1) vs. Complex-Plural (Class 3) 
5.5 Phase 5. Implementation: Take action  
After the debate and discussion, the stakeholders reached the conclusion shown in Table 7. 
 
Table 7. Clarify stakeholder opinions using matrix 
The SQA section analyzed the user-related incidents and, as illustrated in Fig. 18, judged 
that 36% of them were possibly product-related. Following their debate and discussion, the 
SQA section, the help desk, and the development section agreed to change their KPI from 
the AFR to ACR. The incident reduction scheme is illustrated in Fig. 18. Over the two years 
of the operation with the new KPI, the ACR have been reduced respectively by 
approximately 52, 17, 51, and 19% for products A, B, C, and D with the overall average of 
36% reduction in Fig. 19.  
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Fig. 18. Incidents transition over two-year period 
 
Fig. 19. ACR transitions 
5.6 Phase 6. Reflection: Acquire new learning 
On the basis of the application example described above, we can identify three ways to 
overcome the problem of misunderstanding a Class 2 or 3 failure as a Class 1 failure: 
introduce an absolute goal, close the gap between stakeholders, and enlarge the system 
boundary. All three actions promote double-loop learning because they alter the process 
design to improve system quality or safety. In contrast, single-loop learning leads to side 
effects, as explained for phase four: 
- erosion of safety goals and creation of incentive to report fewer incidents, and 
- failure of a previous fix. 
There are three double-loop learning archetypes. 
5.6.1 Double-loop learning for Class 2 failure archetype (solution) 
As noted above, it is necessary to focus on the possibilities of relative achievement or the 
side effects of a quick fix. A tacit assumption of a gap between stakeholders should be 
surfaced throughout the discussion and debate to close the responsibility gap. Application 
of this solution to the scenario shown in Fig. 15, misunderstanding system failure archetype, 
is illustrated in Fig. 20. The sequence of this archetype is from (1) to (6). Arrow (1) with the 
“+” sign indicates that an increase in the number of Class 2 failures increases the number of 
actions within the system boundary. These actions induce various side effects (erosion of 
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safety goals or reporting fewer incidents), as discussed above. Arrow (2) with the “+” sign 
indicates reviewing the stakeholders’ mental model gap and redefining or adjusting the 
ultimate goal. Arrow (3) with the “+” sign indicates provoking a new action. Arrow (4) with 
the “−” sign indicates that the new action attacks the root cause, which resides outside the 
system boundary. Arrow (5) with the “+” sign indicates eventually reducing the number of 
Class 2 failures. Arrow (6) with the “+” sign indicates the path to adjusting the goal and 
defining the ultimate solution.  
 
Fig. 20. Double-loop learning for Class 2 failure (solution) 
5.6.2 Double-loop learning for class 3 failure archetype (solution) 
As mentioned in the introduction, the speed of technology advancement and the growth of 
complexity are unpredictable. Therefore, a current goal could later become obsolete. This 
could be the root cause of a system failure, with no party responsible for the failure. In other 
words, the system failure emerges through no one’s fault. This kind of failure can be avoided 
by periodically monitoring goal achievement and benchmarking competitors. The sequence of 
this archetype is from (1) to (8) in Fig. 21. Arrow (1) with the “+” sign indicates that an increase 
in the number of Class 3 failures increases the number of actions within the system boundary. 
These actions do not attack the root cause, so there is no effect on reducing the number of Class 
3 failures, as indicated by arrow (2). Arrows (3) and (4) with “+” signs indicate introducing the 
ideal goal, provoking awareness of the gap between the current and ideal Goals, and adjusting 
the goal and defining the ultimate solution. Arrow (5) with the “+” sign indicates introducing 
a new action, and arrow (6) with the “−” sign indicates attacking the root cause, which reduces 
the number of Class 3 failures, as arrow (7) indicates. Arrow (8) with the “+” sign indicates 
further enhancement of adjust goal and define ultimate solution.  
 
Fig. 21. Double-loop learning for Class 3 failure (solution). 
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5.6.3 Double-loop learning for fix that fails archetype (solution) 
The solution for this archetype is to raise the viewpoint of the problem (Fig. 22). Class 2 and 
3 failures become Class 1 if the presumed system boundary is enlarged. The sequence of this 
archetype is from (5) to (7) in Fig. 22. Arrow (5) indicates enlarging the system boundary to 
incorporate the root cause. This converts Class 2 and 3 failures into Class 1 failures. Arrow 
(6) with the “−” sign indicates attacking of the root cause, which reduces the number of 
Class 2 or 3 failures, as indicated by arrow (7).  
 
Fig. 22. Double-loop learning for fix that fails archetype (solution) 
Figure 23 summarizes the result of SFDM from problem archetype to solution archetype. It 
shows introducing quick fix (reinforcing current action) is only causing various effects 
(Erosion of safety goals; incentive for reporting fewer incidents and Fix that fails 
archetypes).  
 
Fig. 23. Problem and solution archetypes in engineering system failures through time. 
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6. Conclusion  
In the ICT engineering arena, the predominant methodologies for promoting system quality 
and safety are deeply rooted in hard systems thinking. Most organizational processes are 
reductionist approach. This is reasonable to some extent. Engineers in the development 
section see systems as the combination of components. The quality of these components 
determines the quality of the system if the system boundary is defined within the 
aggregation of components. Therefore, the key performance indicators they use for daily 
routine processes are not drawn from outside the defined system. In the hard systems 
thinking paradigm, an efficient approach is to identify deviances from the internal goals and 
rectify them. The predominant techniques and methodologies play a major role in the 
simple unitary domain of the meta-methodology called “system of system failures (SOSF)”. 
However in a complex and pluralistic stakeholder’s environment, it is clear that several side 
effects were detected in the “system failure dynamic model (SFDM)” process. This is mainly 
because the discussion and debate is done among different system levels of stakeholders. 
The third SOSF dimension represents the responsible system class in VSM terminology. The 
debate between system 1 and system 5 from different stakeholders could introduce 
unwanted side effects, as explained in section 5. Especially in the case of failure of evolution 
in pluralistic contexts, representatives of opposing stakeholders should be from system 5. It 
is particularly effective in critical system practice, even in the ICT engineering arena, to 
expand the focus to not only ‘work; technical interest’ but to ‘interaction; practical interest’. 
The “total system intervention for system failure (TSI for SF)” methodology is useful for 
changing to an absolute goal learning from the gap between stakeholders and enlarging the 
system boundary. 
We conclude with a summary of the checkpoints and corresponding actions. 
Checkpoint 1: Is there a recognizable gap between the perceptions of the stakeholders? If 
not, use the stakeholder matrix to clarify them. 
Action1: Close the gap between the stakeholders. The debate should be conducted with the 
same system level from stakeholders. 
Checkpoint 2: Is your KPI related to absolute goal? (i.e., absolute customers) Do your 
customers know your KPI? If not, assess the viability of introducing absolute goals. 
Action2: Introduce absolute goals to avoid local optimization and to ensure that the essential 
goal is pursued. 
Checkpoint 3: Is the system boundary clear? If not, clarify the boundary. If yes, discuss the 
feasibility and effectiveness of enlarging the boundary. 
Action3: Enlarge system boundary. This would enable to reexamine current system 
boundary and effectiveness of the process. This could be useful to find out side effects. 
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